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State responsibility for transboundary harm by its
nationals apropos the Bhopal tragedy
T.S. RAMA RA,O

In the Bhopal tragedy case, the Government of India has stopped short of
proceeding against the Union Carbide (America), the parent multinational company,
for damages for the tort of discharge of MIC fumes in the Bhopal company and the
consequent killing and injuring of numerous Indian citizens in Bhopal. It has
scrupulously avoided proceeding against the United States Government (IS such by
invoking the principle of State responsibility, for the acts and omissions of the United
States company. This may be because it feels that the legal grounds for proceeding
against the United States may not be very strong or because it is afraid of jeopardising
the friendly relations with the United States Government, and incurring its hostility.
Neither ground seems justified. The first ground, viz., the legal liability of the United
States will be examined in detail' below, The second reason seems to the present
writer the more probable one for the Indian Government's inaction, as it is in line
,with the Government's earlier failure to sponsor the claims of its citizens or of
persons of Indian origin who have been brutally deprived of their properties without
compensation and often forcell to migrate to India penniless, by other countries like
Uganda, Burma, Sri Lanka, etc. without the Indian Government utilising the remedies
available to it under the International Law ru1es regarding State Responsibility,
evidently due to the desire not to antagonise fellow Afro-Asian Governments.l In fact
one wonders whether the well established International Law rules of State
responsibility for injuries to citizens are at all utilized to their optimum extent, by
Indian and other Afro-Asian Governments. The Western Governments treat these as
purely legal issues, which shou1d in no way be construed as being barred by the
friendly political ties with other countries. In fact, for them, protecting the interests of
their citizens against hostile foreign governmental action is the paramount duty of
their Governments. The United Kingdom and France and Israel went to war with
Egypt just fot the reason that President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company
without paying appropriate compensation. Their Governments particularly the United
States Government, not only sponsor and pursue the claims of their nationals to the
bitter end, but often succeed in eliciting the consent of other Governments for
referring the unresolved disputes concerning such claims to arbitration beginning with
the Alabama Claims Arbitration down to the Trail Smelter Arbitration and the recent
1.

One should include in this rubric instances of unjustified benevolence to neighbouring countries, as
in the instance of (1) India's gifting away Katcha Theevu to Sri Lanka, without seeking to refer the
disputcregarding
the island to arbitration and subsequently amending the treaty of cession by
making the surrounding waters, as Sri Lanka waters, (2) the Shastri Srimavo Pact, taking back
thousands of persons of Indian origin without consulting their wishes, etc.
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reference of United States' claims against Iran to arbitral settlement. Afro-Asian
States should equally learn to insist that settlement of disputes regarding the claims of
their nationals against foreign States is a purely legal issue and should not be
construed as affecting the friendly political relations with other countries.
Coming now to the legal position regarding the liability of the United States for
the tort of the Union Carbide (America), we have the clear precedent of the Trail
Smelter Arbitration2 which held that "the Dominion of Canada is responsible for the
conduct of th,e Tfaii Smelter", a private Canadian Company, whose discharge of
Sulphur Dioxide fumes, caused damage to land and other interests in the
neighbouring State of the-United States. Mr. R.W. Ianni points out: "Since the Trail
Smelter Arbitration, however, the trend has been towards extending the' responsibility
of States to cases where. it has neither directly participated in, nor' been directly
responsible for, the injurious act. Since a State claims absolute jurisdiction over
everything that takes place in its territory, it follows that it should be absolutely
responsible for anything that occurs in its territory and causes injury, directly or
indirectly, to another State. Thus, the act of an individual in its territory should be
imputed to it. For example, if it permits individuals to carryon activities in its territory
which discharge effluent into the air, and that effluent subsequently causes serious
injury to persons or property in another State, it should be liable in international law
for the damage so caused. The conclusions of the tribunal in the Trail Smelter
Arbitration give unequivocal expression to the responsibility of States in such
matters: ... under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United
States, n9 State has the right to use or pennit the use of its tenitory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.,,3(Emphasis added).
Gunther Handl, points out in his article on "State Liability for Accidental
Environmental Damage by Private Persons" as follows: "In 1972 the
World Bond, a tanker registered in Liberia, leaked 12,000 gallons of crude oil into the
sea while unloading at the Atlantic Richfield refinery at Cherry Point, Washington.
The' oil eventually spread to Canadian waters and befouled beaches in British
Columbia. The Canadian Government thereupon sent a note to the U.S. State
Department in which it expressed its "grave concern about this ominous incident" and
noted that "the government wished to obtain firm assurances that full compensation
Transnational

2.

3.

3 U.N. Rep0rts of International
Arbitral Awards (U.N.RIA.A.)
1941. The award reql!ired the
Canadian Government
to pay $. 4,28,000 to the U.S. and the company also was made to spend
twenty million dollars for controlling the emission of the fumes. See R W ,Ianni's /ntemational and
Private Actions in Transboundary Pollution, 1973, Canadian Year Book of //Ilemational Law, p. 258,
at p. 262.
R W. Ianni, ibid., at p. 260. He further states: "There have been some assaults on the international
credentials of this arbitral decision in that by Article 4 of the 1935 Convention the tribunal was "to
apply the law and practice followed in dealing with cognate questions in the U.S.A. as well as
international law and practice." There can be little doubt that the tribunal reached its conclusions
on the basis of decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The tribunal, however, did find that
"the law followed in the United States in dealing with the quasi-sovereign rights of the States of the
Union, in the matter of air pollution whilst more definite, is in conformity with general rules of
international law." 35 Am. J. In!,1 L. 713-15 (1941).
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for all damages, as well as the cost of clean-up operations, (would) ... be paid by
those legally liable." In reviewing the international legal implications of the oil spill,
the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs noted: "We are especially
concerned to ensure observance of the principle established in the 1938 Trail Smelter
Arbitration between Canada and the United States. This has established that one
country may not permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury to
the territory of another and shall be responsible to pay compensation for ar,y injury so
suffered. Canada accepted this responsibility in the Trail Smelter case and we would
expect that the same principle would be implemented in the present situation."
The interesting aspect of this statement
is the Canadian
Government's
interpretation of the Trail Smelter case as a precedent for the Cherry Point claims,
namely, as imposing strict and original liability on the United States in respect of
both clean-up and damage costs incurred in British Columbia. Accoroing to the
Canadian Government, the mere fact that the private activity was carried on within
United States jurisdiction and control - thus, without regard to whether the United
States itself was at fault - gave rise to United States responsibility to pay
compensation.'04
Handl further points out that the Liberian Tanker Juliana ran ground and split
apart off Niigata on the West Coast of the Japanese island of Honshu and that oil
seeping from the wreck washed ashore and had a significantly damaging impact on
local fisheries, and that the Liberian Government
offered 200 million yen in
compensation to the fishermen.s He gives other instances of States assuming liability
for extra territorial damage caused by private citizens, without any wrong being done
by the Government at all.
However, Handl feels that such evidence is not conclusive on the general issue of
a State's liability for all acts of environmental damage by private persons, but that "it
should be permissible to proceed on the assumption that strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities exists as a principle of present general international law",6 and
powerfully supports the similar conclusion of Dr. C.W. Jenks in his seminal lectures
at the Hague Academy on "Liability for Ultra-hazardous Activities in /ntemational
Law".7

Handl's conclusions are rather conservative. He states: "transnational damage
due to an accident involving an abnormally dangerous activity of international concern
will give rise to strict state liability",8 while in other circumstances liability is based on
fault only. Besides, he contemplates a subsidiary liability for the state subsi<.liary to the
private transnational polluter's primary liability "when the private polluter's assets as
well as his insurance coverage may stand in no relation to the damage caused", in view
of "the state's ultimate control over the transnationality hazardous activity and the

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1980 Am. J.I.L., p. 524 at p.545.
Ibid, p. 547.
Ibid, p. 553.
117 Recueil Des Cours 99.
Fourth Report of Quenlin-Daxler Doc A/CNf(\/383

and Add 1.
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benefit it presumably derives
from it",9 This formulation
instances such as the Bhopal tragedy.

would certainly

cover

Mr. Quentin Baxter of the International Law Commission has prepared a series
of reports on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not,
prohibited
by International
Law, which would cover cases of transboundary
environmental
damage due to legitimate activities within a state. The schematic
outline prepared by him contains a 'compound primary obligation', consisting of four
duties, to prevent, inform, negotiate and repair. The last duty to make reparations is
important which arises if negotiations fail and a conventional regime has not been
agreed upon. The reparations are to be determined according to a balance of interests
test, taking into account several principles, factors and matters enunciated in'section
5,6 and 7 of the schematic outline.lO Danil Barstaw Magraw points out that "the duty
to make reparations thus is not equivalent to a rule of strict liability, but It approaches
and may be identical to stFict liability, if the harm was unpredictable, or if the harm
was predictable and the source state ignored the first three duties (to prevent, inform
and negotiate) completely."1l Thus, Quentin Baxter's report is a progressive one,
which in effect rejects the theory of liability based on fault only and in effect seems to
restore the law enunciated in the Trail Smelter decision. Unfortunately, while in his
earlier reports, he had adopted a comprehensive test of liability covering all instances
of transboundary harm, resulting from human activity, within the territory or control
of one State, affecting persons or things within the territory or control of another
State, in his fifth report, he restricted liability to activities or situations having a
"physical quality" and required that "the consequence must flow from that quality and
not from an intervening policy decision".12 The new Draft Article 1 regarding scope
reads as follows: "These draft articles apply with respect to activities and situations
which are within the territory or control of a State and which do or may give rise to
physical consequence affecting the use or enjoyment of areas within the territory or
control of any other State." In his speech to the Commission introducing the Report
Quentin Baxter stated that "the activities and situations had to have a physical quality
and the consequence had to flow from that, quality not from an intervening policy
decision. Thus the stockpiling of weapons did not entail the consequence that the
weapons would be put to a belligerent use and would therefore not on that ground, be
covered by the draft articles. On the other hand in so far as the stockpiling of certain
weapons could involve a danger accident or misappropriation, it entailed an inherent
risk of disastrous misadventure and it would come within the scope of the draft
articles.,,12 This speech thus excludes only "consequences from an intervening policy
decision" and not "consequence from an accident or misappropriation".
Thus
considering the fact that UCC (America) ga\'e the know-how of manufacture of MIC
9.
10.
11.
12.

Quentin Boxter's "Third Repor/ on IlIfc/"I/arionai Uability for Injurious Consequcnccs Arising Olll of
Acts Not Prohibiled by /nlen/alional Loll· ... C.\". Doc A/CS.4/B60 and also his 4th Report. (U'i
Doc A/CN.4/373).
Denil Barstai Magraw: "Transboundm)' Ilarm: n,c IlIfc/"I/aiional Law Commission 5 5wdy of
/nu:mational LiabiliIY". 1986AJIL. p. 305 at p. 313.
Fifth Rcpon of Qucmin-Baxtcr Doc A/C.N./1I/383,
anu ,\do, 1.
See Summary Meetings of the 36th Session of ILC. 7th \lay to 27 July, '84, 1848th meeting. Agenda
item 7, Year Book of the ILC (19&4)Vol. I. p. 1')8at p. 200. para 12.
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to its Indian subsidiary and also held a majority of the shares in it and nominated a
majority of directors and thus controlled the subsidiary, and thus in effect itself
"stockpiled" the MIC in India, and the United States controlling it are directly liable
for the "accident" at Bhopal, under the above article. No intervening policy decision
was involved as MIC was being manufactured throughout and only an accident
intervened.
Magraw however argues otherwise from the requirement of Quentin Baxter that
"the activity or situation must have a physical effect and a physical quality and that
effect must flow from that quality via a physical linkage". He feels that the last~
mentioned criterion apparently requires that the transboundary effect occur or be
transmitted via natural physical media, such as, atmosphere, water or earth, rather
t!:-~_•• via economic, political or cultural media.13He states that "one issue is whether
the allegedly negligent acts (on the part of UCC America) have the physical
characteristic as required by draft Article 1. Although the answer is not certain, it
seems that they do not: their alleged effect was physical (personal injury) and they
were part of an activity that had a physical quality (manufacturing pesticides) but the
effect did not flow from the U.S. via a 'physical linkage' but rather via international
trade or inter-corporate communications".14
In answer one may first refer to an American case referred to as the Allied
Chemical and Kepone controversy. IS In this case an American multinational company,
Allied Chemical Corporation, transferred the know-how of manufacturing Kepone, an
agricultural chemical, to Life Science Product Company (LSP), which was an
independent company and not just a subsidiary. Still the Allied Chemical Corporation
was held by an American judge to be liable for injuries caused to workers in Life
Science Product Company due to exposure to Kepone without adoption of adequate
safeguards by Life Science Product Company and was fined a huge amount even when
the judge accepted the plea that Life Science Product Company was not a subsidiary
but a different company with which Allied Chemical Corporation dealt with "at arms
length", for the simple reason that know-how was transferred without verification
whether the necessary standards for protection of the workers were observed by Life
Science Product Company. While so, the liability for the acts of a subsidiary like UCC
(India) is all the clearer. And the theory of strict liability and the above principle
which (of liability of the transferor of know-how for not enforcing environmental
standards) have progressively become part of the municipal law of most countries
and hence one may treat them as general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations making a State liable for ultra-hazardous extra territorial pollution by
its companies.
Secondly, under the above illustration given by Quentin Baxter himself (of
stockpiling of nuclear weapons and damage due to an accident or misappropriation),
the Bhopal case will come within the scope of Draft Article 1, as argued above.
13.
14.
15.

D.M. Magraw, op. cit note 10, at p. 134.
/bid, p. 314.
This is dealt with in detail in S. Prakash Sethi, Up Against Corporate Wall, Part D Chapter I entitled
"Allied Chemical and the Kepone Controversy".
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Thirdly, Magraw's thesis proceeds on the assumption that the parent company
and the subsidiary of a multinational corporation are different entities. Many
decisions of the United States as well as European courts have treated the
multinational corporation as a single legal unit, liable for the acts of the subsidiaries,
ignoring the distinction between the parent company and the subsidiary.16Besides, the
United States Government is found enforcing congressional enactments. like Trading
with the Enemy Act 1964 by directing the American parent company to order its
subsidiary not to trade with an enemy government, thus enforcing the Act of extra
territoriality. Hence not only do the multinational corporations fmiction as a single
unit, the separate incorporation of the subsidiary being merely a legal clock covering
the reality of parent company control but they are.very much regulated by the United
States Government itself. Under the circumstances, UCC as a muftinational
corporation should be treated as a single composite unit responsible for the discharge
of MIC fumes and if this is so, the physical linkage between the multinational
corporation and the tort is a direct and established one and is not broken up by
. international trade or corporate advice etc. And given the reality of United States
Governmental control over the multinational corporation's incorporated in the
United States, Stat~ responsibility of the United States for the acts of the
multinational corporation should be taken as established. Besides, the Trail Smelter
precedent would admittedly be applicable first when MIC fumes escape from an
American company affecting a neighbouring State and secondly, whena branch of an
American company in another country is responsible for its discharge there. The case
of a discharge from a subsidiary company's factory in a different country should
equally attract the. Trail Smelter precedent, given the reality of\ the multinational
corporation being a composite unit, subject to the control' of United States
Government.

* * * ,..

16.

See T .$. Rama Rao's "Relation between the Parent Company and the Subsidiary - A Key Issue in the
Case," paper submitted to the Nagpur University Seminar on "Perspective of a New
International Economic Law", January 30th to 1st February, 1988.
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